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PUBLIC DEBT AS PRIVATE WEALTH
SOME EQUILIBRIUM CONSIDERATIONS
EKKEHART SCHLICHT
ABSTRACT. Government bonds are interest-bearing assets. Increasing public debt
increases wealth, income, and consumption demand. The smaller government ex-
penditure is, the larger consumption demand must be in equilibrium, and the larger
must be public debt. Conversely, lower public debt implies higher government
spending and taxation.
Public debt plays, thus, an important role in establishing equilibrium. It dis-
tributes output between consumers and government. In case of insufficient demand,
a larger public debt entails higher private consumption and less public spending.
If upper bounds on public debt are introduced (as in the Maastricht treaty), such
constraints place lower bounds on taxation and public spending and may rule out
macroeconomic equilibrium. As an aside, a minor flaw in Domar’s(1944) classical
analysis is corrected.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E2, E12, E6, H6
. INTRODUCTION
Government bonds are interest-bearing assets. As such, they constitute part of
private wealth. This note considers the case of a closed economy that grows at
a certain natural rate. With a given rate of interest, weak consumption demand
necessitates a certain amount of public debt to establish long-term equilibrium at
full employment. It turns out that there exists a trade-off between public debt on
the one hand and government spending and taxation on the other: The higher
the level of public debt, the lower will be taxation and government spending in
equilibrium. As a consequence, upper bounds on public debt (as in the Maastricht
treaty) imply lower bounds on government spending and taxation.
The issue of public debt is often discussed in a setting where the time-paths of
employment and production are fixed and public debt has no role to play in
affecting these quantities. The argument presented here considers the case of
full employment, too, but introduces the restriction of a fixed rate of interest that
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precludes full employment without government intervention. Government must
boost demand either by increased government spending or by reduced taxation. It
is shown that such policies lead to stable outcomes with stable shares of government
spending and government debt and a stable rate of taxation. The case of a fixed
rate of interest may apply if the rate of interest is so low that it cannot be reduced
any further, or if the central bank stabilizes the rate of interest by a kind of Taylor
rule, or if the rate of interest is to be kept at a minimum level in order to prevent
dynamic inefficiency.
Other contributions, most notably Domar (1944) and Gehrels (1957b), have dis-
cussed similar issues in a framework of unemployment where Keynesian multi-
pliers are of relevance. The following considerations pursue related questions in a
full employment setting: Government succeeds in maintaining full employment
by adjusting taxes, government expenditure, and public debt appropriately while
observing its budget constraint, and a globally stable steady state obtains. As Franz
Gehrels’ (1957a, 633) has observed much earlier: ”Stability of growth . . . depends
heavily on the proper use of the public budget to adjust disposable income and
household wealth.”
The argument is presented in terms as simple as possible. A closed economy is
assumed. The rate of investment is just right (given the prevailing real rate of
interest, wages, population growth, and technical progress), and private income
and wealth has a positive effect on consumption demand. The direct effect of
wealth on consumption is formalized in the spirit of Pigou (1947) and Gehrels
(1957b) by adding wealth as an argument in the consumption function. This is an
entirely conventional approach, which has been used in many expositions such as
Blinder and Solow (1974, 4, 51) or Branson (1989, 525-30). The case of a constant
propensity to save is covered as a special case. Here the interest income generated
by public debt is of relevance only, and the wealth effect is absent, yet the overall
result is maintained.
In Section , the algebra is outlined. In Section , the case of fixed government
spending with a variable tax rate is analyzed, and in Section  the case of a constant
tax rate with variable government spending is analyzed. It is proved that the
dynamics lead to stable outcomes in both cases. Section  discusses the economic
function of public debt and considers cases of zero government spending and
zero taxation. Section  ponders the effects of upper bounds on public debt of
the type enforced by the Maastricht treaty in Europe. All this is analyzed under
the assumption of a given real rate of interest. Section  touches the effect of the
changes in the rate of interest briefly. Section  gives some numerical illustration
for the case of a constant savings rate. The analysis is compared with the classical
analysis by Domar (1944), and a minor flaw is corrected. Section  discusses briefly
some issues relating to a view on public debt put forward by Barro (1974, 1979,
1989), and how this relates to the present analysis. Section  concludes with some
cautionary remarks.
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. THE MODEL
Consider a simple macroeconomic model of a closed economy with a government
that levies an income tax with a proportionate rate τ. Net product at full employ-
ment (potential value added, the sum of wages and profits minus depreciation)
is X. The purpose of the tax is to finance government expenditure G and interest
payments for government debt D. The purpose of government expenditure, debt,
and taxation is to provide public goods and maintain full employment. We write:
G = X− I − C ()
with I denoting net investment and C denoting consumption.
We assume an economy growing at the natural rate n. The real rate of interest i is
at first assumed constant. As this rate of interest determines capital intensity, it
determines capital productivity.1 With a constant rate of interest, we have, thus,
a constant rate of net capital productivity (as the inverse of the capital-output
ratio) x := XK . The growth of the capital stock is given by K˙ = I with I as net
investment. Full employment requires the capital stock to grow at the rate n,
implying investment demand I = nK.
Regarding consumption, we follow Gehrels (1957b), Clower and Johnson (1968),
and others and take consumption as a function of current disposable income YD
and wealth V with consumption increasing in income and wealth:
C = C (YD, V) , C, YD, V ≥ 0, 0 < ∂C∂YD < 1,
∂C
∂V
≥ 0. ()
This consumption function may be rationalized in various ways. One alternative
would be to assume with Clower and Johnson that wealth enters the utility function
directly; another would be that wealth affects the inter-temporal budget constraint
of households, and this impinges on consumption, as in Modigliani and Brumberg
(1954), or, more recently, in Woodford (1998). In this sense, the specification () is
fairly flexible.
The consumption function is assumed linear homogeneous. Using this property,
we can re-write it as
C = ϕ (ω)V ()
with
ω :=
YD
V
()
1A special case would be the standard neoclassical case: if f (k) denotes output per efficiency unit
of labor as a function of capital per efficiency unit of labour, marginal productivity theory would
require f ′ (k) = i with dkdi =
1
f ′′ < 0 under the standard assumption f
′′ < 0. As capital productivity
is x = f (k)k with
dx
dk = − 1k
(
f
k − f ′
)
< 0 under standard assumptions, capital productivity would be
an increasing function of the rate of interest. The case of a constant rate of interest implies a constant
capital productivity, therefore. The case of a varying rate of interest–and an entailed varying capital
productivity–is briefly dealt with in Section .
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as the income-wealth ratio and
ϕ (ω) := C (ω, 1) ≥ 0, ϕ′ > 0 for ω ≥ 0 ()
as the consumption-wealth ratio. This implies together with ()
ϕ′ = ∂C
∂YD
, 0 < ϕ′ < 1, ϕ− ϕ′ω = ∂C
∂V
, ϕ− ϕ′ω ≥ 0.
Note that the case of a constant average propensity to consume, as discussed by
Domar (1944, 801-2), is covered with
ϕ (ω) = µ ·ω, 0 < µ < 1
and µ as the propensity to consume.
Private wealth V is the sum of the capital stock K and financial wealth in the form
of government debt D:
V = K + D. ()
The returns to real and financial wealth are the same and are given by the rate of
interest i. Hence profit income is P = iK, wage income is W = X − iK, and the
interest income from government debt is iD. In order to have positive wage income,
the rate of interest must satisfy the condition i < x.
Total net income is the sum of wage income, profit income, and income from
government debt:
Y = X + iD. ()
Disposable income is income minus taxes, and therefore
YD = (1− τ) (X + iD) . ()
Tax receipts are
R = τ (X + iD) . ()
The budget constraint of government is given by the bookkeeping identity that
government expenditure plus interest payments must be equal to tax revenue and
the increase in government debt:
G + iD = R + D˙. ()
For the subsequent argument it is convenient to express the various quantities (pro-
duction, income, disposable income, government expenditure, government debt,
consumption, and tax receipts) relative to the capital stock, using the corresponding
lower-case symbols:
x :=
X
K
, y :=
Y
K
, yD :=
YD
K
, g :=
G
K
, d :=
D
K
c :=
C
K
r :=
R
K
. ()
As the capital stock grows with the natural rate n, we have D˙ =
(
d˙ + nd
)
K and ()
and () imply the budget constraint of government
r = τy = g + id− nd− d˙. ()
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With () and (), equations () and () can be written as
yD = (1− τ)(x + id) = x + nd− g + d˙
ω =
(1− τ)(x + id)
1 + d
=
x + nd− g + d˙
1 + d
. ()
From (), (), and () we obtain
c = ϕ
(
(1− τ)(x + id)
1 + d
)
(1 + d)
or alternatively
c = ϕ
(
x + nd− g + d˙
1 + d
)
(1 + d) ,
depending on whether we wish to parametrize by government expenditure g or
the tax rate τ.
Collecting terms, we can re-write () in two alternative but equivalent ways:(
ϕ
(
(1− τ)(x + id)
1 + d
)
+ n
)
(1 + d)− (1− τ) (x + id) + d˙ = 0, ()
ϕ
(
x + nd− g + d˙
1 + d
)
(1 + d) + n + g = x. ()
Equation () allows for an analysis of the evolution of government debt under
the assumption that the tax rate is constant and the government runs surpluses or
deficits such as to maintain full employment; equation () permits an analysis of
the dynamics of public debt under the assumption that government expenditure is
kept constant and the tax rate is adjusted to maintain full employment.
Equations () and () both imply the equilibrium condition
ϕ (ω¯) + n = ω¯ ()
with ω¯ as the equilibrium income-wealth ratio. The intuition behind this result is that,
in any steady state, wealth must grow with the natural rate n. The growth rate of
wealth is equal to the savings-wealth ratio which is ω¯− ϕ (ω¯).
Proposition 1. The equilibrium income-wealth ratio is an increasing function of the
growth rate and independent of other variables such as the rate of government spending,
taxation, the rate of interest, or capital productivity.
Note that () reduces to ω¯ = n1−µ for the case of a constant propensity to consume
µ.
. FIXED GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Consider first the case in which government controls demand by adjusting the
tax rate while keeping government spending g fixed over time, as described by
equation (). The following proposition states that in case demand is insufficient
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with fully tax financed government spending in absence of public debt, government
can maintain full employment by adjusting taxes. Under this policy, public debt
will build up and will eventually grow at the natural rate at which income grows.
Proposition 2. In case of insufficient demand at zero debt
ϕ (x− g) + n + g < x ()
there exists a unique equilibrium debt level d¯ > 0 which is approached if the government
pursues a full employment policy through tax adjustment.
Proof. Equilibria are given by () with d˙ put to zero:
ϕ
(
x + nd− g
1 + d
)
(1 + d) + n + g = x. ()
By assumption the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side for d = 0. With
d ↑ ∞, we have ϕ −→ ϕ (n) and the left-hand side becomes arbitrarily large. For
continuity reasons there must exist an equilibrium debt level d = d¯ > 0 such that
() is satisfied.
Equation () can be solved for d˙, and the derivative with respect to d can be
evaluated at d˙ = 0:
∂d˙
∂d
∣∣∣∣
d˙=0
= − ϕ
′n + (ϕ− ϕ′ω)
ϕ′ < 0.
This establishes stability and uniqueness since d˙, considered as a function of d, must
pass the abscissa with negative slope which can occur only once. 
With (), (), and (), the equilibrium debt rate d¯ can be expressed in terms of
the equilibrium income-wealth ratio as
d¯ =
x− g− ω¯
ω¯− n > 0,
dd¯
dg
= − 1
ω¯− n < 0. ()
where ω¯ > n is implied by ().
The corresponding equilibrium tax rate is
τ¯ =
g (ω¯− n) + (x− g− ω¯) (i− n)
x (ω¯− n) + i (x− g− ω¯) ()
with
dτ¯
dg
=
(x− i) (ω¯− n) ω¯
(i (x− g− ω¯) + x (ω¯− n))2 > 0
Putting things together we obtain
Proposition 3. Equilibrium debt d¯ is decreasing in government spending g and the
equilibrium tax rate τ¯ is increasing in government spending g.
The intuition is that an increase in government spending requires, according to the
the market-clearing condition c + g + n = x, a decrease in private consumption.
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This decrease in consumption is brought about by a reduction in public debt and
entailed decreases income and wealth.
Note that
1− τ¯ = (x− g− n) ω¯
(x− i) (ω¯− n) + (x− g− n) i > 0.
The equilibrium tax rate will thus always be below 100% as long as there is insuf-
ficient demand without government debt, viz. as long as government spending
satisfies ().
Note further that the equilibrium tax rate will always be positive if the rate of
interest exceeds the growth rate (i > n) but may be negative if the rate of interest
is smaller (i < n) and government spending is sufficiently small. In this case,
equilibrium would require a debt-financed tax subsidy. More specifically, in the
case of zero government expenditure (g = 0), equations () and () specialize to
d¯
∣∣
g=0 =
x− ω¯
ω¯− n > 0, ()
τ¯|g=0 =
(x− ω¯) (i− n)
x (ω¯− n) + i (x− ω¯) ()
and establish positive debt together with a tax rate that is positive for i > n and
negative for i < n in equilibrium for the case of zero government spending.
. A CONSTANT TAX RATE
Consider next the case of a constant tax rate as described by equation (). It defines
a differential equation for relative government debt:
d˙ =
(
(1− τ) (x + id)
1 + d
− ϕ
(
(1− τ) (x + id)
1 + d
)
− n
)
(1 + d) . ()
The following proposition states that in case demand is insufficient for some suffi-
ciently high tax rate τ and government expenditure g = τx is equal to tax receipts,
there exists a unique stable equilibrium level of relative government debt which
will eventually be reached if government maintains full employment by adjusting
its spending.
Proposition 4. In case of insufficient demand
ϕ ((1− τ) x) + n + τx < x ()
and a sufficiently high rate of taxation τ there exists a unique and globally stable equilibrium
debt level (given as a solution to ()) that will be approached if government pursues a full
employment policy by adjusting government spending.
Proof. Write
ω =
(1− τ) (x + id)
1 + d
()
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as in () and note
∂ω
∂d
= −1− τ
1 + d
(x− i) < 0.
From () and () we conclude
d˙
{
T
}
0⇔ ω− ϕ (ω)
{
T
}
n. ()
Regarding existence of an equilibrium we must look at a solution ω to ω− ϕ (ω) =
n. At d = 0 we have ω = (1− τ) x and () and () imply d˙ > 0 at d = 0. For
d→ ∞, we have ω → (1− τ) i. If the tax rate is sufficiently high (say τ > i−ni ) we
obtain
(1− τ) i− ϕ ((1− τ) i) < n
which implies d˙ < 0 for sufficiently large government debt d. For continuity reasons
there exists an equilibrium debt d¯ such that d˙ = 0. As ω is decreasing in debt and
ϕ (ω)− ω is decreasing in ω, we have d˙ > 0 for d < d¯ and d˙ < 0 for d > d¯. This
establishes stability and uniqueness. 
Note that for i ≤ n any non-negative tax rate would be “sufficiently high” and that
for i > n any tax rate would be “sufficiently high” that pushes the rate of interest
after taxes (1− τ) i below the natural rate n.
As in the case of fixed government spending discussed in the previous section,
equilibrium debt is characterized by the unique income-wealth ratio ω¯ defined in
(), and the equilibrium debt rate d¯ can be expressed as
d¯ =
(1− τ) x− ω¯
ω¯− (1− τ) i ()
with
dd¯
dτ
= − (x− i) ω¯
(ω¯− (1− τ) i)2 < 0.
The corresponding equilibrium rate of government spending g¯ is
g¯ =
(1− τ) (x− i) ω¯
(x− n)ω+ (1− τ) (n− i) x ()
with
dg¯
dτ
=
(x− i) (x− n) ω¯2
((x− n)ω+ (1− τ) (n− i) x)2 > 0. ()
Proposition 5. Equilibrium debt d¯ is decreasing in the tax rate τ and equilibrium govern-
ment spending g¯ is increasing in the tax rate τ.
The intuition is that a higher rate of government spending requires higher taxation
and increases aggregate demand. This demand increase must be compensated by a
reduction in public debt and an entailed reduction in wealth and income.
For a zero tax rate, equations () and () specialize to
d¯
∣∣
τ=0 =
x− ω¯
ω¯− i ()
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and
g¯|τ=0 =
(x− i) ω¯
(x− n)ω+ (n− i) x .
Proposition 6. With insufficient demand, a zero tax rate requires positive debt and positive
government spending in equilibrium.
. THE FUNCTION OF PUBLIC DEBT
The two policies discussed in the previous sections (controlling the economy either
by fixing the tax rate and adjusting government spending, or by fixing government
spending and adjusting taxation) are basically equivalent: Ultimately, we will have
C + I + G = X and c + n + g = x. If, as in the preceding argument, a fixed level
of investment is assumed, the government decides on the ratio c/g of private
consumption to public spending, either by selecting g directly or by selecting the
corresponding tax rate τ. If the level of government spending is decided on, the tax
level serves to adjust consumption to x− n− g. This usually implies a changing
debt level until equilibrium is reached. By fixing a tax rate and by adjusting
government spending, the same steady state will be obtained.
The relation between the tax rate τ, government spending g, and equilibrium debt
d¯ follows from propositions 3 and 5: Selecting an increased rate of government
spending implies an increased tax rate in equilibrium, and vice versa, and selecting
an equilibrium with a higher rate of government spending and a matching tax rate
decreases equilibrium government debt d¯.
Public debt serves an important function in economic co-ordination: It controls the ratio of
private consumption to public spending. A higher share of private consumption implies a
higher rate of public debt in equilibrium, associated with a lower level of public spending
and taxation.
In the case of insufficient demand presupposed throughout, there is still the possi-
bility to go either for zero taxation (τ = 0) or for zero government spending (g = 0)
because the stimulation of consumption demand can be obtained by building up
public debt. These two policies are equivalent if and only if the rate of interest
coincides with the growth rate. Otherwise these two policies are mutually exclu-
sive because they imply different levels of government spending. Regarding the
implications for public debt, equations () and () imply
d¯
∣∣
τ=0 − d¯
∣∣
g=0 =
x− ω¯
(ω¯− i) (ω¯− n) (i− n) .
Proposition 7. Equilibrium debt will be higher with zero taxation than with zero govern-
ment spending if and only if the rate of interest exceeds the growth rate.
. MAASTRICHT CONSTRAINTS
The Maastricht treaty places two constraints on public debt: One is that the share
of government debt in GDP is not to exceed a certain threshold α, and the other
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requires the growth of public debt not to exceed a certain fraction β of income.
Assuming a rate of depreciation δ, gross product is X + δK, and the constraints can
be written as
d ≤ α (x + δ) , ()
D˙ ≤ β (x + δ) K. ()
Equation () gives the level restriction, and () gives the increment restriction. In
the Maastricht treaty the constants are fixed at α = 0.6 and β = 0.03, respectively.
Consider what happens if one or the other restriction is binding.
1. The level restriction. Consider the level restriction () first. If equilibrium debt
satisfies
d¯ ≤ α (x + δ) ,
equilibrium can be attained; otherwise it is ruled out. As equilibrium debt is
inversely related both to government spending and the tax level (proposition 3)
government may raise government spending and taxes in tandem in order to meet
the equilibrium constraint. The level restriction places lower bounds on government
spending and taxation:
g ≥ x−ω− (x + δ) (ω¯− n) α,
τ ≥ x− ω¯− (x + δ) (ω¯− i) α
x (1 + iα) + iαδ
.
These lower bounds increase if the level constraint is tightened (reduced). In this
sense, a tightening of the Maastricht level constraint enforces higher government
spending and taxation in equilibrium. This occurs because increased government
spending entails lower consumption spending and lower public debt.
With regard to dynamic adjustment we have to consider several cases:
Case 1. Equilibrium debt d¯ and initial debt d0 both satisfy the Maastricht level constraint.
In this case, the level constraint will not bind and adjustment will remain unaffected
and will remain stable.
Case 2. Equilibrium debt d¯ exceeds the Maastricht level constraint and initial debt d0
satisfies the Maastricht level constraint. In this case, the government must raise gov-
ernment spending and taxation in order to obtain the state of affairs of case 1, and
adjustment proceeds in the same way. If there exists, for some level of government
spending, an equilibrium, it can be reached in this manner.
Case 3. Equilibrium debt d¯ satisfies the Maastricht level constraint and initial debt d0
exceeds the Maastricht level constraint. In this case, debt must be reduced. The change
of debt is given by the government’s budget constraint () and is to be negative,
say, −r:
d˙ = g + ((1− τ) i− n) d− τx = −r.
This must be consistent with the differential equations () and (), and this gives
the implied rates of taxation and government expenditure. Replacing d˙ by −r in

E K K E H A R T S C H L I C H T
() implies
∂τ
∂r
=
1
(x + id) ϕ′
> 0.
In a similar way, () implies
∂g
∂r
=
ϕ′ − n
1− ϕ′
which will be positive for the relevant case ϕ′ > n as well. Hence government will
have to increase both spending and taxation in order to reduce the debt level to the
Maastricht requirement while maintaining full employment. At the same time, the
associated equilibrium debt level will be reduced. In the end, the Maastricht level
constraint will be met and adjustment can proceed as in Case 1.
Case 4. Neither equilibrium debt d¯ nor initial debt d0 satisfy the Maastricht level constraint.
In this case, debt reduction would be required as in Case 3. This would involve
increasing government spending and taxation, and this would decrease equilibrium
debt. In the end, an equilibrium will be attained provided the constraint is not so
tight as to rule out equilibrium.
2. The increment restriction. Consider the increment constraint next. From the
definition of d as D/K we have D˙ =
(
d˙ + nd
)
K. In equilibrium (d˙ = 0) the
increment constraint () reads
d¯ ≤ β
n
(x + δ) . ()
The increment constraint is, with regard to equilibrium, equivalent to some level
constraint. If αn = β holds true, the constraints () and () amount to the same.
For the Maastricht case with α = 0.6 and β = 0.03, a growth rate of n = .05 would
define this break-even point. The level constraint will be binding in equilibrium for
growth rates below five per cent., and the increment constraint will be binding for
higher growth rates.
Regarding adjustment, the increment constraint reads
d˙ ≤ β (x + δ)− nd.
If it is binding, it eventually enforces a debt level βn (x + δ). If the equilibrium debt
level is below this threshold, the increment constraint ceases to bind and adjust-
ment to the equilibrium debt level obtains. If the equilibrium debt level is larger,
government spending and taxation must be increased such that the equilibrium
debt level meets the equilibrium increment constraint ().
In conclusion, the two Maastricht constraints both constrain the level of public debt.
At best, they do not bind. Otherwise they enforce high government spending and
taxation or rule out equilibrium.
A note to the purists: In case of insufficient demand, any Maastricht constant of
zero rules out the existence of equilibrium for sure, as both α = 0 and β = 0 enforce
d¯ = 0.
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Note that all these considerations have been made under the assumption that full
employment is maintained throughout. Additional formidable problems occur
with regard to dynamic adjustment if unemployment is taken into account. The
Maastricht treaty is not geared to the potential output x but rather to realized output
xr which may be lower. In case of a negative demand shock, the Maastricht level
constraint would thus force a reduction in government spending or an increase in
taxation, driving aggregate demand further down, and the Maastricht increment
constraint would enforce a reduction in government borrowing, a reduction of
government spending and an increase in taxation. While the full-employment
policies pursued in absence of the Maastricht constraints would induce a stable
adjustment, the Maastricht constraints may induce instability in this sense, and it
will hurt future generations by reducing capital formation and on-the-job training.
All in all, the Maastricht treaty seems not to be a strike of genius.
. THE RATE OF INTEREST AND PUBLIC DEBT
Up to now, a given rate of interest has been presupposed. This may be adequate
in case that the interest rate has reached such a low level that it cannot be reduced
anymore, or that it is not advisable from an allocational point of view to reduce it
further. (If the rate of interest i is below the natural rate n, this can be interpreted
as implying dynamic inefficiency, for instance. Note also that modern monetary
policy tends to stabilize the real rate of interest at a certain level.)
We may ask, however, what may happen if the rate of interest can be changed. The
easiest way is to think about a neoclassical growth model where the rate of interest
is positively related to capital productivity2:
x = x (i) , x′ > 0.
An increase in i reduces capital intensity and increases capital productivity. In the
following the consequences from steady state solutions arising from this effect are
considered. The analysis remains rudimentary, though, as it excludes problems of
transition and direct effects of the changes in interest on consumption.
Recall that the equilibrium income-wealth ratio ω¯, as defined by (), is to be
constant in equilibrium, independently of i. As x = x (i), equation () defines the
equilibrium debt ratio d¯ = d (i) as a function of i :
d (i) =
(1− τ) x− ω¯
ω¯− (1− τ) i .
Its derivative is
d′ (i) =
(1− τ) (x′ + d¯)
ω¯− (1− τ) i =
(
1 + d¯
) (
x′ + d¯
)
x− i > 0.
Hence equilibrium debt d¯ = d (i) is an increasing function of the rate of interest,
given any rate of taxation τ.
2See footnote 1.
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With a varying rate of interest it is not very appropriate, though, to study the effect
of such changes on the debt-capital ratio d, because an increasing rate of interest
goes along with a decrease in effective capital intensity and an increase in capital
productivity. We may be more interested in the share of public debt in the net
product x, which will be denoted by q:
q =
d (i)
x (i)
. ()
This implies
q′
q
∣∣∣∣
τ=const
=
d′
d
− x
′
x
=
(1− τ)
ω¯− (1− τ) i +
ω¯x′
((1− τ) x− ω¯) x > 0.
With a fixed tax rate, the equilibrium share of government debt in production will
increase with an increasing rate of interest.
The share of debt in income moves in the same direction:
z =
d (i)
x (i) + id (i)
⇒ ∂z
∂i
∣∣∣∣
τ=const
=
((1− τ) x− ω¯) + (ω¯− (1− τ) i) x′
ω¯ (x− i)2 > 0.
Next turn to the case of fixed government spending and a variable tax rate. The
equilibrium income-wealth ratio ω¯ implies
d¯ =
x− g− ω¯
ω¯− n .
As x is increasing in i, equilibrium debt d¯ will increase with an increase in the rate of
interest if government spending is kept constant. With fixed government spending,
the equilibrium share of debt in production is
q =
x− g− ω¯
(x− g− n) ω¯ ⇒
∂q
∂x
∣∣∣∣
g=const
=
ω¯− n
(x− n− g)2 ω¯ > 0.
(This uses x = ϕ (1 + d) + n + g and ω¯ − ϕ = n). As x is increasing in i, an
increase in the rate of interest increases the share of debt in production if the share
of government spending in production is kept constant.
The share of debt in income moves in the opposite direction, however:
z =
d (i)
x (i) + id (i)
⇒ ∂z
∂i
∣∣∣∣
g=const
= − (g + ω¯) (ω¯− n) x
′ + (x− ω¯− g)2
((g + ω¯) i + (n− i− ω¯) x)2 < 0
If public debt is required to meet some constraints, as in the Maastricht treaty, a
varying rate of interest may enforce changes in government spending and taxation
that appear quite arbitrary from an efficiency point of view. A change in the rate of
interest may lead, for given taxation or government spending, to a violation of a
Maastricht constraint and would enforce an increase in taxation and government
spending as in Case 4 above even if the initial ratio of government spending to
private spending was just right, or even excessive.
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. SOME CALCULATIONS IN THE SPIRIT OF DOMAR
Domar (1944, 823-5, Cases 1 and 3) assumes a constant propensity to consume,
denoted here by µ, which implies ϕ = µ ·ω. Equation () reduces to
d˙ =
1− µ
µ
(x− g)− 1
µ
n− nd. ()
This differential equation has the globally stable solution
d¯ =
1− µ
nµ
(x− g)− 1
µ
()
with the implied tax rate
τ¯ = 1− n (x− g− n)
(x− g− n) (1− µ) i + nµ (x− i) . ()
For zero growth, this tax rate is 100 per cent. - even if government spending is zero.
(This result corresponds to Domar’s Case 1.) The derivative of () with respect to
g is
∂τ¯
∂g
= − (x− i) µn
2
((x− g− n) (1− µ) i + nµ (x− i))2 > 0 ()
which reconfirms the positive association between government spending and taxa-
tion. However, Domar looks at the ratio of government borrowing to production
γ :=
D˙
X
=
d˙ + nd
x
()
and keeps this fixed. (Our γ stands for Domar’s α.) Equation () gives rise to the
differential equation
d˙ = γx− nd
with the unique stable equilibrium solution
d¯ =
γx
n
which is equivalent to Domar’s equation (10). Equating this with () yields equi-
librium government spending parametrized by the Domar constant γ
g =
x ((1− µ) n− γµ)− n
(1− µ) n ()
which shows the inverse relationship between government borrowing - as ex-
pressed by the Domar constant γ - and government spending. Because of the
positive association between government spending and taxation given in (), this
result carries over to taxation: A higher rate of government borrowing implies a
lower rate of taxation.
Domar defines the “tax rate” differently, however. It is, in our terminology,
τDomar :=
di
x + di
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and in equilibrium
τ¯Domar =
iγ
n + iγ
whereas () and () imply a lower tax burden:
τ¯ =
iγ− γ µ(1−µ) − nx(1−µ) − n (1− γ)
(n + iγ)
< τ¯Domar.
The difference comes about mainly because Domar has identified the additional
tax burden with interest payments for public debt, but this shortcut is flawed. In a
growing economy, government debt will grow at the natural rate as well. A larger
public debt implies larger government borrowing, therefore, which offsets part
of the interest payments on public debt. This renders it possible that equilibrium
taxation is less than interest payments on public debt. Further, Domar’s partial
analysis has neglected the constraints on government spending and taxation coming
from the full employment requirement that will imply a reduction of government
borrowing over time. A constant rate of government borrowing will occur only in
equilibrium.
As a numerical illustration consider the case of a rate of savings of 10 per cent, a
growth rate of 2 per cent, a capital-output ratio of 3 and a share of government
spending in the net product of 20 per cent. This implies µ = 0.9, n = 0.02, x = 0.33,
and g = 0.2 · x = 0.066. Equation () now reads
d˙ = 1.33− 0.02d
with the equilibrium debt ratio d¯ = 0.356 and the solution
d (t) = 0.356 + (d0 − 0.356) e−0.02·t
where d0 denotes initial debt. The associated development of the tax rate is given
by the government budget constraint () as
τ (t) =
g + (i− n) d (t)− d˙ (t)
x + id (t)
.
These are plotted in Figure 1.
The associated share of government expenditure in net production (as in ()) is
q (t) = d(t)x , roughly the threefold of d. Its equilibrium value is q¯ = 1.07.
Varying the rate of government spending changes the equilibrium level of public
debt as indicated in Figure 2. (To calculate gross capital productivity x + δ, a rate of
depreciation of 3 per cent is assumed.)
The Maastricht constraints imply in equilibrium d ≤ 0.22 (level constraint) and
d ≤ 0.45 (increment constraint). As shares of gross product, we have dx+δ ≤ 0.6 and
d
x+δ ≤ 1.5, respectively.
The relationship between government’s share and the rate of taxation is not very
sensitive to changes in the rate of growth or in the rate of interest. This is illustrated

P U B L I C D E B T A S P R I V A T E W E A L T H
FIGURE 1. Public debt and the tax rate with a share of government
spending of 20 per cent. in net production. Assumed parameter
values: 10% savings rate, 2% growth rate, 0.33 capital productivity,
20% share of government spending in net production, 2% interest
rate, initial debt of zero.
FIGURE 2. The share of government spending in gross produc-
tion and the share of public debt in gross production. A rate of
depreciation of 3% is assumed, the other parameter values are as
in Figure 1. The Maastricht increment constraint requires a share
of government spending above 10% (increment constraint) and
25% (level constraint).
for the case of a fixed capital productivity in Figures 3 and 4. This runs somewhat
against the grain of Domar’s argument.
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FIGURE 3. The relation between government’s share in gross pro-
duction and the tax rate for alternative growth rates and 4% rate
of interest. The other parameters are as in Figure 1.
FIGURE 4. The relation between government’s share in gross pro-
duction and the tax rate for alternative rates of interest with a 2%
growth rate. The other parameters are as in Figure 1.
. NOTES ON “RICARDIAN” ASPECTS
Taking present values on the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the budget
equation () and integrating by parts yields∫ ∞
0
e−itGtdt + D0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−itRtdt
or, for short
G + D0 = R. ()
This corresponds to Barro (1979, eq. (2)) and makes sense if and only if the rate of
interest exceeds the growth rate, as will be assumed in the following. As the budget
constraint () has been presupposed throughout the analysis, the “Barro budget
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constraint” (), as it may be termed, remains valid in this analysis. In this sense,
the present analysis does not involve any contradiction to Barro’s formal analysis.
The same holds true with regard to the households’ budget constraint. From
(), (), (), () and I = K˙ we conclude that the difference between income and
spending on consumption and taxes goes into wealth accumulation, either to capital
accumulation or to holdings of public debt:
Yt − Ct − Rt = I + D˙ = V˙.
Taking present values, using Yt = Xt + iDt, and re-arranging terms yields
C = X − G −K+ K0. ()
Hence, for given time-paths of production Xt and capital stock Kt, the present
value of government spending G determines the intertemporal budget constraint of
the households. From this, Barro (1974) concludes that, given government spending,
government debt does not change the households’ consumption possibilities and
constitutes, therefore, no “real net wealth”. As (Barro, 1989, p. 51) explains, the
“Ricardian approach to budget deficits amounts to the statement that the govern-
ment’s fiscal impact is summarized by the present value of its expenditures. Given
this present value, rearrangements of the timing of taxes – as implied by budget
deficits – have no first-order effect on the economy.” This cannot be disputed in
the present model either, but there is no “Ricardian Equivalence” between taxation
and government debt, as both are yoked together and must move together; there
is no possibility for “rearrangements of timing,” and in this sense, no “Ricardian
Equivalence” exists.
Thus equations such as () and () that underlie Barro’s analysis are satisfied in
the present context, too, and do not undermine to the position that public debt may
serve an important economic function. Yet Barro’s analysis may suggest something
different, namely that, with fixed government spending, a reduction in taxation
with an entailed increase in public debt would be fully offset by an increase in
private savings because it would not affect the households’ intertemporal budget
constraint and would leave their time-paths of consumption unaltered. As a
consequence, the mechanisms discussed here would not work, and fiscal policy
would be impotent in affecting aggregate demand. The effects studied in this paper
could not occur in the Barro framework. The alleged inflationary experiences under
“Keynesian” policies in the 1970s seem to suggest otherwise, though, and the model
studied here assumes that an increase in future taxation due to an increase in public
debt is not fully offset by increased savings. In the end, the issue boils down to
the empirical question whether a tax reduction can, or can not, increase private
consumption. Empirically this seems to be the case, and the argument presented
here presupposes that.3
3Barro (1989, 49) admits: “Many empirical studies have searched for effects of budget deficits or social
security on consumption and saving. . . . Basically, the results are all over the map, with some favoring
Ricardian equivalence, and others not.” Yet the cases where a rise in government debt might have been
compensated fully by a corresponding decline in private consumption seem to be extremely rare. The
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. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The argument makes the point that government debt bears an important macro-
economic function: It allocates output between private consumption and public
spending. Lower taxation and lower public spending imply higher public debt in
equilibrium. Upper bounds on public debt may enforce high government spending
and taxation and may undermine macroeconomic equilibrium.
The argument has been presented for the case of “insufficient demand” character-
ized by conditions () and (). A symmetric case of “excessive demand” would
require negative public debt–i.e. the accumulation of financial assets–by govern-
ment. For the case of a constant rate of savings this can be seen directly from
().
Further, the argument has been presented for a closed economy. It is apparent,
though, that foreign assets that are entailed by export surpluses perform a similar
role as public debt.
The argument should not be seen, however, as an unabashed defense of “Keynesian”
policies of uncontrolled public spending, since an important feature of reality is
suppressed here, namely, the possibility of inflation - even accelerating inflation -
at low levels of employment. This phenomenon will curtail attempts to maintain
full employment through Keynesian measures, as well as supply-side measures.
The phenomenon is well illustrated by the former West German experience where
unemployment increased from below 1 per cent in the seventies to the current 9 per
cent without any noticeable effect on wage formation, and in spite of weakening
labor unions, increased flexibility, and increasing international competitiveness.
This phenomenon has been neglected by Keynes (1936, 298-303) who thought
that inflation would build up near full employment only, and recent ”natural
rate” theorists share this problematic Keynesian assumption. The new classical
economists, on the other hand, cannot be reproached in this manner as a lack (or
excess) of aggregate demand would be disregarded by them, being inconsistent
with their theoretical approach.
The argument may, however, be read as a defense of Keynesian full employment
policies if proper safeguards against inflation are implemented at all employment
levels.
Equilibrium exercises as the one presented here may arguably be quite irrelevant
for economic policy, but then arguments that object to government debt in terms
of long-term outcomes are irrelevant as well. It has been shown here that such
recent study by Berben and Brosens (2005) covering 17 Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries finds, for example, that disposable income, equity wealth and housing
wealth affect consumption positively and significantly, while government debt does affect consumption
significantly and negatively, but the effect is very small, and the net effect brought about by an increase
in government debt (the effect of an increase in financial wealth minus the effect of the corresponding
increase in government debt on consumption) is positive in all cases. Note that the argument of this
paper would go through even if those effects would just offset each other, if only disposable income is
related positively to consumption demand.
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objections are severely misleading in any case, as they entirely neglect an important
equilibrating function of public debt.
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